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Abstract
Using a step-level public good game, we analyze the eﬀects on contributions
of having played under a sanctioning regime. We find that ”educational” eﬀects,
in terms of learning a particular way to coordinate towards ”good” equilibria, are
more relevant than motivational ”crowding out” eﬀects, whereby cooperating to
avoid sanctions spoils intrinsic incentives. If groups vote, they decide to remove the
costly sanctioning regime; then they cooperate as much as in automatic removal
only when this decision entails a clear ”trust” message.
JEL classification: C91
Keywords: Public Good, Step-level, Sanctioning Institution, Cooperation, Edu-
cation, Trust
1 Introduction
There exists a huge amount of literature on levels of cooperation in public good and
other social dilemma games. A lot of this literature discusses how to enhance the level
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of cooperation (see e.g., Ostrom, 1998). Punishment has been discussed as one eﬃciency
enhancing mechanism (e.g., Fehr & Gaechter, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002; Ostrom et al.,
1992), but is has also been discussed whether it might crowd out voluntary cooperation
(Frey & Jetgen, 2001). The use of bonuses instead of punishment and punishment ex-post
(i.e., a punishment-possibility which had not been announced before) have been analyzed
as alternatives, but with varying results (e.g., Rapoport & Au, 2001, Fehr & Gaechter,
2000). In experiments by Fehr et al. (2002), the possibility of costly punishment exhibited
by other members of the group enhances contributions. However, in consecutive sessions
without punishment opportunities, contributions went down again immediately, such that
obviously no ”norm”of cooperation could be established using punishment.
Punishment mechanisms are used in many real-world settings to enhance contribu-
tions in social-dilemma-type situations. However, usually this does not imply punishment
done directly by other parties in the social-dilemma situation, but rather by a (legiti-
mated) institution. Examples are the police together with other kinds of institutions of
the juridical system, institutionalized punishment for breaking rules within social groups,
schools, universities etc., but also more ”extreme” situations like UN-peacekeeping mis-
sions in countries where a war has been ended. However, institutionalized punishment
mechanisms, like, e.g., a police, are costly, and perfect control is often neither possible nor
desirable. Therefore, in many situations it is desirable to have the possibility to establish
voluntary cooperation instead of having to control and punish other parties. One social
mechanism which helps to reach cooperation without punishment is mutual trust among
the members of an interdependent group or society (see., e.g., Smith, 2002). However,
quite often, punishment institutions are just established because mutual trust is lacking.
Lewicki & Bunker (1996) suggest, that interpersonal trust can develop in situations, where
first ”trust”- or rather trusting behavior - is ensured by an eﬃcient punishment mecha-
nism. In their view, such a punishment-mechanism can be a first stage in the development
of trust. They call this kind of trust ”institutional” or ”deterrence based” trust. In this
stage, members of a society or group trust only in (the eﬃciency of) the punishment
institution which enforces cooperative behavior. Lewicki & Bunker (1996) assume that
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from deterrence-based or institutional trust, ”knowledge-based” trust can develop, as over
time the experience that others cooperate becomes internalized (see also Kramer, 1999).
Shapiro et al. (1992) however see institutional trust as very fragile and assume that it
will break down when the punishment mechanism does not work eﬃciently or disappears.
Some of the institutions mentioned above are based on the belief that deterrence-based
trust can transform into ”real” trust or at least self-sustaining cooperative behavior. An
example are the peace-keeping troops mentioned, which are sent into countries at the end
of (civil) wars to establish a new order, and after an agreed-upon time leave the country
again.
The results of the experiments of Fehr et al. (2002) however seem to indicate that
this might not be eﬃcient and that Shapiro et al. (1992) might be right: In their ex-
periment, after ten rounds with punishment-option cooperation broke down immediately
when punishment was no longer possible.
As mentioned above, there is also some literature that assumes and provides evidence
for the fact that punishment mechanisms might reduce incentives for voluntary cooper-
ation (e.g., Frey & Jetgen, 2001). This is supposed to happen when there is a negative
incentive, i.e., a punishment mechanism, available ex ante, and more so when this mech-
anism is used, because this is seen as a distrusting act by other members of the group or
society at hand. Fehr et al. (2002) find, that the existence of a bonus-mechanism or a
punishment mechanism which is not used leads to far higher cooperation rates. However,
this has only been tested for situations where other members of the group could directly
punish free-riding group members. A legitimate ”external” punishment mechanism might
not have these negative eﬀects, as research on the eﬀect of fair procedures indicates as
well (see, e.g., Tyler & Kramer, 1996). Therefore, such a mechanism might be able to
solve the problem of how to implement a punishment threat such that it does not crowd
out voluntary cooperation and even leads to trust-building over time.
Ostman et al. (1999), using external ”punishment” institutions in a commons game,
found that legitimate external punishment institutions do lead to more cooperative be-
havior. However, this only held in their experiments when the sanction was perceived as
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adequate. Otherwise, the punishment device disrupts group solidarity and leads to even
less cooperation.
Recently, research in experimental economics deals with the influence of ”voice” or
”voting” on outcomes in group-situations (see e.g., Aquino et al., 1992, Kroll et al., 2002).
This interest is based on the notion that perceived procedural fairness is a very impor-
tant determinant of (cooperative) behavior. One kind of procedures which are perceived
as fair are usually those where people, who are aﬀected by a decision, have their voice
heard before the decision is made (see, e.g., Tyler & Kramer, 1996). Therefore, one pos-
sible factor determining whether disappearance of the punishment institution leads to a
breakdown of cooperation or not could be whether the group decided to dismiss the pun-
ishment institution (by a vote) or whether it was just taken away. It is however possible,
that group members vote against the punishment institution for diﬀerent reasons: First,
it could be that an (unanimous or majority) vote to dismiss the punishment institution
could be an expression of trust. Members of the society or group express their trust that
the other members will continue to cooperate even without the punishment mechanism.
This should then lead to equal or even higher levels of cooperation after removal of the
punishment mechanism. However, another possibility would be that either those who are
prone to free-ride, or those who would in general cooperate but do not believe in other
people’s voluntary cooperation vote for dismissal of the punishment institution to get rid
of its costs and to be able to free-ride on other’s eﬀort without being punished. This
should especially be the case when cooperation was not reached even with the punish-
ment institution. In such a situation, people who would rather free-ride (individualists or
competitors, in terms of social value orientations (see e.g., Kurzban & Houser, 2001, Van
Vught, & Gramzow, forthcoming) prefer not to have the punishment institution because
it is costly and they get punished when free-riding, but don’t get the public good either.
On the other hand, people who are cooperatively oriented, also would then vote against
the institution, as they suﬀered from the free-riders and had to pay for the - ineﬃcient -
punishment institution. Beckenkamp & Guembel (2000) find that the influence of social
value orientations on behavior in social dilemma games decreases when the number of
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experienced defections by others increases. In their experiments, people of all value orien-
tations get more and more angry when cooperation does not work out, and are less prone
to cooperate. A moderate sanctioning system proved to be eﬃcient in reducing anger of
those who were confronted with experiences of defection.
The research described here has one main aim: To find out how a punishment device
can be installed and removed such that it does not lead to a crowding out of voluntary
cooperation, but rather to trust-building and continuous cooperation after removal of the
punishment mechanism. The experiment therefore is designed to test several things: First,
it can be seen what happens to cooperation when the punishment institution disappears
either automatically or after a vote for it. Secondly, as data is collected over all rounds,
it is possible to see whether experiences in the rounds with the punishment institution
influence the vote and behavior after the vote.
In the next section, the general design is described. Then, predictions and hypotheses
are developed formally. The fourth section describes the design in more detail. The fifth
section shows the results, and the last section discusses them and concludes.
2 General experimental design
A public goods game is played in stable, randomly determined groups of five players, who
interact anonymously for fourteen rounds. Each player in each round has an endowment
worth 10, and has to decide over his cooperation (via the choice of an integer number
between 0 and 10) towards reaching a ”goal”, that is set to be 31. If 31 is reached, the
public good is ’produced’ and each player receives an equal part of it. If 31 is not reached,
no public good is created so that any positive contributions are simply ”lost” and each
player only receives what he has kept.
In the basic treatment, generic player i’s payoﬀ in any given round is then defined as:
πi =



10− gi + 12 if
P5
j=1 gj ≥ 31
10− gi otherwise
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This design sets 12 as the common reward given to all members if the goal is reached,
no matter how. For instance, we could have a combination of contributions reaching
exactly 31 or going beyond, up to 60; contribution levels across members could diﬀer
substantially or be equal. If the goal is not reached, contributions are ”lost” and all
players are left with what they saved out of their endowments.
As is typical for public good games, higher contributors get lower payoﬀs, and that
holds both for the case where the goal is reached and for the case it is not.
In the alternative treatments, we introduce an external punishment mechanism, called
”police” here (but not in the instructions for participants), which punishes players who
choose a contribution strictly lower than 6.
The police mechanism has a cost, set equal to 3. The punishment is set at level 6. We
get:
πpi =



10− gi + 12− 3 if
P5
j=1 gj ≥ 31 and gi ≥ 6
10− gi + 12− 3− 6 if
P5
j=1 gj ≥ 31 and gi < 6
10− gi − 3 if
P5
j=1 gj < 31 and gi ≥ 6
10− gi − 3− 6 if
P5
j=1 gj < 31 and gi < 6
Notice that having all five members in a group choosing the minimal level of cooper-
ation to avoid the fine, 6, is not suﬃcient to reach the goal 31.
Three diﬀerent treatments are used. In the baseline treatment, the public goods game
is played for 7 rounds without the ”police”. In the ”police removal” treatment, groups play
with the police for seven rounds, and then seven more rounds without it. In the ”voting”
treatment, majority voting occurs after seven rounds with the police. Groups determine
whether they continue with the same rules or whether the ”police” is removed. We are
interested in observing whether groups who decided to remove the police get higher or
lower total contribution levels than groups where the police was removed automatically.
Moreover, we will observe whether individual voting decisions are related to contribution
behavior.
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3 Predictions and comparisons
We first present an equilibrium analysis based on the assumption that each player is
rational and maximizes his expected payoﬀ, and know that these characteristics are shared
by all the others members of his group. Later in the paragraph we are going to explore
possible eﬀects of ”other-regarding” preferences.
In each round with the rules of the basic treatment,
P5
j=1 gj = 31 is a suﬃcient
condition for any strategy profile (g1, g2, g3, g4, g5) to be a Nash equilibrium. In fact, none
among the members has an incentive to deviate: neither decreasing his contribution, since
the individual loss of 12 can only partially be compensated by saving on g (in particular,
if gi = 10 and
P5
j 6=i gj = 21 then if i deviates and chooses 0 his payoﬀ changes from 12 to
10) nor increasing it, thereby ”wasting” additional resources. The other Nash equilibrium
features g = 0 for all players. Notice that this equilibrium, in which every player gets
10, is the only egalitarian one (you cannot split equally the total contribution 31) and is
Pareto dominated by all previous ones (again, if gi = 10 and
P5
j 6=i gj = 21, then i gets
12, i.e. more than 10, and all others get at least as much). On the other hand, the five
equilibria with the lowest inequality and
P5
j 6=i gj = 31 have all players choosing 6 except
for one, picking 7.
In rounds including the ”police” mechanism, for all players the strategy ”6” weakly
dominates ”0”: the value of the fine, 6, compensates the benefit obtained by playing 0
(with respect to playing 6, the minimum to avoid the fine) in terms of saving on contri-
bution. It may be that the contribution 6 is decisive for reaching 31. All positive choices
between 1 and 5, are strictly dominated by 6 and, therefore, cannot be part of Nash equi-
libria. The profile (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) still constitutes a Nash equilibrium, since every strategy
involved is at least weak best response to the other players’ choices. Also, profiles where
two or more players pick 0 and the others 6 are N.E. Other Nash equilibria involve one
player picking 0 and the others choosing numbers such that the sum is 31. However, if
we accept the N.E. refinement which excludes weakly dominated strategies, we are left
with the remaining five N.E., where one player chooses 7 and the others 6. Notice that
7
here we get to this equilibrium selection immediately after deleting the weakly dominated
strategies, without recurring to any iterated deletions.
Summing up, two main eﬀects are provoked by the police. The first is a beneficial
selection of Nash equilibria: if we remove weakly dominated strategies, the goal is always
reached in equilibrium. The second has a distributive nature: the equilibria so selected
are the most egalitarian among the ones where the goal is reached.
Things are more complicated in absence of the police. Notice that it is impossible
to Pareto-rank the diﬀerent Nash equilibria in which 31 is achieved, while they are all
Pareto superior with respect to the ”all 0’s” equilibrium, and of course all profiles out of
equilibrium (where some contributions are ”wasted”) are at least weakly dominated by
one or more profile corresponding to a Nash equilibrium. It is then harder, with respect
to the setting with the previously described sanctioning mechanism, to get an intuition
about which equilibrium to select. This diﬃculty is relevant as players should find a way
to coordinate their choices if they want to reach 31.
A possible ”focal” Nash equilibrium is the same which is obtained with the police after
deleting weakly dominated strategies: the most egalitarian one with all players choosing
6 and one of them 7. In fact, among the ”good” equilibria, it is the most compatible with
recent models developed in economic literature (in particular, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999
and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) which focus on inequality aversion as a main feature
of ”other-regarding” preferences. Broadly speaking, inequality averse agents prefer, for a
given own payoﬀ level, the situation were the others get the same. On the other hand, this
type of player (shown to be significantly frequent in a variety of settings) will quickly drop
his contribution if he observes other members doing so, since he dislikes to be poorer than
the others (avoiding unfavorable inequality is also found to be typically more important
than aversion to be richer).
Selfish players, on the other hand, will tend to choose a contribution with the objective
of maximizing their expected value. Therefore, they contribute a certain level only if they
are convinced that such level is critical for reaching 31. In particular, a risk neutral
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individualist i chooses g∗i = argmax
gi
10 − gi + 12Pr{
P5
j 6=i gj ≥ 31 − gi}. A risk neutral
”cooperator” or ”altruistic” player, defined as caring about himself and the others, is
going to set a higher value than the g∗i , if he shares the same beliefs as the individualist’s.
That follows from the fact that these players take into account the positive externality of
increasing the probability of others’ payoﬀs to increase, besides his own.
As we can see, in all these cases expectations about others’ choice play a fundamental
role, which is particularly critical in absence of a sanctioning mechanism. How do agents
form expectations in a repeated game? A simple hypothesis is that they take choices in
the previous round as a basis, as naively assuming that the others repeat the same choice.
Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that if exactly 31 was reached, most players will
stick to the previous choice; if contributions were partially redundant, some players will
try to save by partially reducing the contribution. In case 31 was not reached, instead,
some players may try to make it possible by increasing their contribution, but only as
long as the distance is not too large. The problem is that other members could switch
to zero or low contributions at the same time. In general, only if the distance is small a
group has significant chances to get to 31 after a failure to do so, while a larger gap is
probably taken as evidence of uselessness of contributing a positive level. So, if and how
agents are able to coordinate to achieve 31 depends on several factors.
One of the main questions is which eﬀect is caused by the previous presence of the
police. In light of what we said so far, it may happen that the way people coordinate with
the police, i.e. issuing 6 or 7, could be replicated once the police is removed. That is based
on the naive assumption of choice repetition by other members. In fact, this assumption
could be self-fulfilling: if all players in round 8 of the ”police removal” treatment keep
the previous choice - as long as 31 was reached in the previous rounds with the police
- they will find their expectations realized. Most of them could stick to that strategy.
While having played with a sanctioning device can help coordination, it is also shown in
the ”motivational crowding-out” line of research that such device can have detrimental
eﬀects on motivation (see, e.g., Frey, 2000). As previously argued, the idea is when the
police is there, subjects cooperate only because it is there, and lose any other motivation
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such as desire of cooperating, altruism etc. In the police removal setting, this could make
the attainment of 31 not robust to any small deviations. That is, willingness by members
to update their contributions upwards to compensate partial free riding could be very
low, and therefore contribution levels could get lower and lower towards later rounds. If
crowding out happens in situations with automatic removal of the punishment mechanism,
a countervailing eﬀect could be observed in the ”voting” treatment: In case of groups
having obtained 31 with the police and then deciding to remove it. The interpretation
as a signal of trust in the ability by the group to cooperate and coordinate even without
the police could spur cooperative motivations and make these groups sustain suﬃcient
contribution levels in the rounds following the vote for police removal.
3.1 Hypotheses
3.1.1 Educational eﬀect (EE)
Playing with a sanctioning mechanism which provides incentive to contribute at least 6
”teaches” players a particular way to achieve the common goal, 31, namely having all
players choosing at least 6 and one or more of them choosing something higher - in Nash
equilibrium, only one choosing 7. Once players have learned to coordinate in this way, it
becomes natural for them to keep playing in the same way also in absence of the ”police”.
If this hypothesis is correct, we should observe (i) higher contribution levels in round 8
in the police removal (PR form now on) treatment both with respect to round 1 and
with respect to round 8 in the Baseline (BL) treatment and (ii) higher contribution levels
overall in rounds 8-14 in PR both with respect to rounds 8-14 and with respect to rounds
1-7 in BL. Recall that the removal occurs after seven rounds in which the police operates.
As a consequence, round 8 is the first in which players act with the knowledge (reminded
on their screen) that the rules have changed, and the sanctioning mechanism is not there
anymore. If the police has an unambiguously positive educational eﬀect, contributions
in PR in round 8 should be higher than contributions in case players has no preceding
experience (round 1 in BL) or in case they had played an equal amount of rounds without
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sanctions (round 8 in BL). As for long term eﬀects, we also compare rounds 8-14 in PR,
with respect to 1-7 in BL, to see whether the first rounds in the same conditions feature
diﬀerent contribution levels, and to 8-14 in BL, to check whether the result does not
change once we have the same number of rounds played in the two treatments.
3.1.2 Crowding-out eﬀect (COE)
Playing with a sanctioning mechanism harm intrinsic motivation to cooperate with peers
towards reaching a certain goal. It develops the idea that people contribute only as
long as sanctions exist. These have two potential eﬀects: not only each agent feels lower
cooperative tendencies than he would normally do, but also expects others to contribute
only to prevent sanctions. So a selfish person, who may contribute as long as he feels
that it is in his own interest, tends to feel low trust in the possibility that his peers will
contribute enough to make his own contribution decisive towards reaching 31. For these
reasons, the comparisons described in the ”educational eﬀect” hypothesis should have an
opposite sign.
Of course as these eﬀects move in opposite directions, we are going to find which one,
if any, is stronger than the other in our specific set-up.
3.1.3 Voted removal eﬀect (VRE)
If the police is removed because most players in a group has chosen to do so, after reaching
31 in the rounds in which they played with the police, it means that group members trust
each other in their ability to reach that contribution totals without the need of coercion.
This ”trust message” that players are exchanging could have positive eﬀects, together
with self-determination (as the decision is taken by those who are aﬀected), especially in
terms of fostering those intrinsic motivations that could be crowded out when the removal
is exogenously determined. Therefore we are going to observe whether groups who have
chosen to remove the police in the voting treatment achieve higher contribution levels than
in PR. We are going to compare round 8 in case of ”voted removal” (VR) with round 8 in
PR, and overall levels in 8-14 in VR and PR. Also, we are going to compared behavior in
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VR with respect to BL: round 8 in VR is compared with 8 and with 1 in BL, and rounds
8-14 with 8-14 and with 1-7 in BL (the rationale for the choice of rounds to compare is
the same as before, when PR was contrasted with BL). So, we are going to see whether
trust and group self-determination entail positive eﬀects on contribution, by comparing
VR with PR, and whether those eﬀects, together with ”education” compensates possible
”crowding out” negative eﬀects, so that contributions are higher than in BL.
4 Sample and Procedure
The sample consisted of 120 students of Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain,
who participated voluntarily for performance-based payment. They came from diﬀerent
faculties, mostly from Economics, Business and Law.
In each session, 3 stable groups of 5 students played the public goods game together.
For the BL treatment, 2 sessions with 3 groups were run. For the other treatments, VR
and PR, 3 sessions with three groups each were run. The experiment was computer-based,
using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999).
The procedure was as follows: When students arrived at the lab, they were randomly
seated in front of a computer. Then instructions were carefully read. There were no
mention of ”police” in the instructions. Police and non-police situations were described
as Rule Set A and Rule Set B. The game started. BL consisted in 14 rounds of the step-
level public good game. PR consisted of 7 rounds of the game with the police mechanism
followed by another 7 rounds of the game without police. Participants were warned after
period 7 that the rules of the game changed. VR consisted of 7 rounds of the game with
police followed by a voting phase. After this participants were informed about the result
of the vote, actually whether the valid set of rules in the next 7 rounds was A or B.
After the experiment, each player was privately paid according to the sum of payoﬀs
across all rounds (3 Euro cents per ”payoﬀ unit” were payed) plus a show-up fee worth 2
euro. Average earnings in the experiment were about 6.2 EURO.
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5 Results
The first and most important result is that groups which experienced the sanctioning
mechanism during the first stage (rounds 1 to 7) cooperated significantly more in the
second stage (rounds 8 to 14). An equivalent result comes from the comparison between
rounds 8 to 14 for PR and VR treatments and rounds 1 to 7 for BL. This can be seen very
clearly in Figure 1 and Table 1. In order to test1 statistically this and further results we
constructed a dichotomic variable assigning "1" to success (the sum of the contributions
reached 31) and "0" to fail. We compared the average number of successes in PR or VR
and BL in the considered stages. Tests always rejected the hypothesis of equality at any
degree of significancy. Therefore we found that the educational eﬀect was stronger than
the crowding out eﬀect in our experiment.
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Figure 1. Treatment Average per Period
1We used SPSS to run all the tests. First we identified which varibles follow normal distributions.
We run T-type tests whenever normality may be assumed, otherwise they are non-parametrical Mann-
Whiteney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
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Figure 2. Number of Groups Reaching 31
1-7 8-14
BL 7% 0%
PR 89% 65%
VR 87% 48%
PR & VR 88% 56%
Table 1. Percentage of Times the Step-Level is Reached
Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarize the results of the three treatments, they show the sum
of the contributions for each round and gorup. The last column contains round averages.
The last three rows contain group average for the two considered stages and an overall
group average.
There was a voting stage between rounds 7 and 8 in treatment VR. The result of the
voting was always in favour of getting rid of the institution.
14
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 Average
1 27 24 19 25 29 26 25.0
2 9 10 24 30 14 21 18.0
3 0 11 16 34 12 23 16.0
4 0 6 10 35 11 22 14.0
5 0 1 8 31 7 19 11.0
6 1 0 13 26 8 17 10.8
7 2 1 11 22 11 12 9.8
8 1 0 5 15 22 11 9.0
9 10 0 4 15 22 6 9.5
10 6 0 1 10 16 8 6.8
11 0 0 1 18 7 7 5.5
12 0 0 1 13 5 11 5.0
13 0 0 1 9 13 3 4.4
14 0 0 2 10 3 2 2.8
Avg. 1-7 5.6 7.6 14.4 29.0 13.1 20.0
Avg. 8-14 2.4 0.0 2.1 12.8 12.6 6.9
Average 4.0 3.8 8.3 20.9 12.9 13.4
Table 2. BL Treatment Data Summary
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G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 Average
1 32 36 35 33 28 26 34 34 34 32.4
2 30 37 35 34 31 29 34 37 36 33.7
3 33 37 35 32 32 33 31 35 34 33.6
4 31 32 35 34 36 41 34 35 34 34.7
5 33 33 34 32 28 34 31 33 35 32.6
6 32 33 36 32 32 36 33 33 33 33.3
7 31 31 30 33 33 28 32 34 33 31.7
8 23 33 33 26 24 29 33 34 36 30.1
9 24 32 34 31 32 30 32 30 33 30.9
10 10 32 37 32 31 29 33 31 32 25.7
11 4 30 36 31 31 30 31 33 34 28.9
12 2 27 32 32 30 31 32 29 31 27.3
13 0 29 32 32 32 31 33 32 32 28.1
14 0 18 26 31 32 32 26 33 34 25.8
Avg.1-7 31.7 34.1 34.3 32.9 31.4 32.4 32.7 34.4 34.1
Avg.8-14 9.0 28.7 32.9 30.7 30.3 30.3 31.4 31.7 33.1
Average 20.4 31.4 33.6 31.8 31.4 31.4 31.4 33.1 33.6
Table 3. PR Treatment Data Summary
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G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 Average
1 33 33 39 34 32 34 33 32 37 34.1
2 27 34 36 32 32 31 31 34 39 32.9
3 35 33 32 33 32 33 26 33 32 32.1
4 25 34 28 34 32 32 32 31 38 31.8
5 27 32 3 32 32 31 33 33 33 31.4
6 28 31 34 33 31 33 31 30 31 31.3
7 30 27 35 31 33 33 32 32 30 31.4
8 15 26 24 33 30 32 26 29 27 24.9
9 9 14 16 28 32 29 32 26 33 24.3
10 3 5 5 33 33 24 31 22 26 20.2
11 0 6 20 33 32 38 29 26 19 21.4
12 10 3 1 3 32 29 29 17 9 17.8
13 0 3 0 31 32 35 18 7 7 14.8
14 0 1 0 33 33 35 11 0 6 13.2
Avg. 1-7 29.3 32.0 33.4 32.7 32.0 32.4 31.1 32.1 34.3
Avg. 1-14 5.3 8.3 8.0 31.5 32.0 31.7 25.1 18.1 18.1
Average 17.3 20.1 20.7 32.1 32.0 32.0 28.1 25.1 26.2
Table 4. VR Treatment Data Summary
Figures 1 and 2 show diﬀerent behavior in treatments PR and VR. The same infor-
mation can be found also in Table 1 and the summary tables. It seems success was more
likely to occur in PR than in PV during the second stage, that is, when the sanctioning
institution has disappeared. Table 5 depicts statistical results on this fact. Indeed, we
can aﬃrm that in average the step-level was reached more times in PR than in VR. The
number of groups reaching 31 was also higher in the ending round. Therefore the "voted
removal eﬀect" resulted opposite to our hypothesis.
17
However, no significant diﬀerence was found between the two treatments in period
eight. Moreover there was no diﬀerence in contributions at period 8 among people who
vote for and against the institution. It seems that voting decreased the trust generated by
having experienced the institution. Actually it is impossible to make a diﬀerence between
people who voted against the institution because they thought it was costly and they
wanted to cooperate and those who wanted to exploit the others in a free-riding way.
According to the statistical tests there was no restart eﬀect, meaning success in reach-
ing the step-level in round 8 did not diﬀer from that in the former rounds. There was no
ending eﬀect either, meaning success in reaching the step-level in round 14 did not diﬀer
from that in the former rounds of the second stage.
Ho Significancy
PR = VR (1-7) Accept
PR = VR (8) Accept
PR = VR (8-14) Reject 5%
PR = VR (14) Reject 5%
No Voting Effect Accept
No Restart Effect Accept
No-Ending Effect Accept
Table 5. Statistical Results Summary
It is possible to relate success or fail in the second stage to the results in the first stage.
We define the variable "slar" (step level always reached) which takes value 1 in case the
total contribution had been always higher or equal than 31 in rounds 1 to 7. We consider
data coming from both PR and VR, so "slar" equals 1 eight times and 0 ten times. It
happens that the correlation between "slar" and the average success in 8 to 14 equals
0.702 and it is highly significant (0.001). If we consider a model with constant it results
avg(8− 14) = 0.243 + 0.507 ∗ slar. Both the constant and the slope are significant.
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Another question we can ask is how a single fail in rounds 1 to 7 aﬀects turst generation.
In order to get an answer we define the variable "jof" (just once failed) which takes value
1 in case there had been just one failure in rounds 1 to 7 and 0 in case there had been no
failure during rounds 1 to 7. We consider data coming from PR and VR, but note that now
the domain is restricted by the fact we are not taking in account groups with more than
one failure in 1 to 7. Therefore "jof" equals 1 six times and 0 eight times. The correlation
between "jof" and the average success in 8 to 14 equals -0.744 and it is highly significant
(0.002). If we consider a model with constant it results avg(8− 14) = 0.750− 0.536∗ jof .
Both coeficients are significant. This regression can be understood as just one failure
increase the chance to fail in rounds 8 to 14 by 53.6%.
6 Conclusions
We conducted an experiment to test the eﬀects of playing a step-level public good game
under a sanctioning system which ”forces” people to cooperate on behavior in subsequent
rounds, once this system is removed. The removal was either automatic or chosen by the
groups according to the simplest majoritarian rule.
The sanctioning system here referred to as a ”police” helps achieving the threshold,
which results in a common reward for all group members, but it leaves room for deviations
in the sense that low levels of cooperation are punished but not impeded altogether.
Moreover, having all members choosing the minimal level of cooperation allowed is not
suﬃcient to obtain the common reward: a small additional eﬀort by at least one player
is needed. In equilibrium analysis, we find that once weakly dominated strategies are
removed all Nash equilibria for a single round are ”good”, in the sense that the goal 31 is
achieved, while in absence of the police the ”all zero” equilibrium is added.
The literature discusses two eﬀects which could arise from a history of playing with
a police: a positive ”educational” eﬀect of learning intuitive ways to reach 31, namely
having all members choosing at least 6 and somebody 7, and also to learn to trust in
each other’s cooperation (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). The other possible eﬀect is a
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negative motivational ”crowding out” of cooperating only due to the presence of the police
(e.g., Frey & Jetgen, 2001). In other words, the police would prevent the emergence of
”genuine” cooperative tendencies which would be necessary in its absence; therefore as
soon as the sanctioning regime disappears contributions should fall down sharply.
This latter eﬀect is not found in our game: the educational or trust-building eﬀect
prevails so that groups which played with the police in earlier rounds are much more
successful in keeping contribution levels high enough to reach the common goal for most
rounds following removal. This result contradicts what is found in other works with
standard public good games. This has natural implications in terms of distinguishing
instances where sanctioning mechanisms have positive, rather than negative eﬀects. In our
design, in fact, the ”police” suggests a particular way to reach a common goal; in settings
with continuous public goods (or in general with respect to ”eﬃciency levels”) setting a
threshold can undermine the drive to cooperate more than that level, as was found by
Fehr and Rockenback (2001), and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (2000) among others. In our
design, going beyond 31 is only wasteful, and therefore learning a particular cooperation
level can only have beneficial eﬀects.
In a third treatment each group decided by majority vote whether to keep the police or
not, to see whether such a procedure has an eﬀect on subsequent behavior (see, e.g., Tyler
& Kramer, 1996). We found that all groups decided to remove the punishment institution
and cooperation levels after removal were higher than in the baseline treatment, but
lower than in the automatic removal treatment. This result at first glance contradicts the
intuition that removing the police by vote should have a positive eﬀect on contribution
levels, arising from the fact that the vote against the police expresses mutual trust between
group members. However, as described already in the introduction, there is another
possibility why a team could vote against keeping the police, namely, that the police is
seen as ineﬃcient but costly. Once we diﬀerentiate groups according to whether in rounds
1-7 failure to reach the threshold occurred despite of the presence of the police, we find
that groups where such failure never happened do succeed to reach the threshold after the
removal, no matter whether the ”police” was voted away or just disappeared. In groups
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where failure occurred in the first seven rounds with police, contributions went quickly
down after removal, especially when the ”police” had been voted away. Our interpretation
is that in such cases voting to remove the police has no clear ”trustful” meaning, but can
be seen as a desire to save on the cost for keeping the police when even in its presence
the attainment of 31 is not guaranteed. The voting treatment thus indicates that if the
removal of the police results from a conscious, well deliberated decision, contributions
are only kept up when the police-mechanism worked and people really developed trust
in each other’s contributions. This result has an essentially ”negative” nature, in the
sense that we find that if police is not completely eﬃcient and therefore trust cannot be
learned, a voting against the police is not an expression of trust and contributions go
down when the police disappears. However, if the voting against the police was a clear
expression of trust, i.e., in situations where with police cooperation always worked out,
cooperation still did not exceed levels of cooperation in the automatic removal treatment.
The latter might be a ceiling eﬀect, as in a step-level public good like ours, 6 resp. 7
is the logical contribution, and enhancing it to 8 or 9 would not make sense. Other
contexts e.g. continuous public goods games, could well exhibit positive ”trust eﬀects”
in such a situation. Another possible interpretation of the diﬀerences found between the
two treatments might be that subjects in the voting treatment thought longer about the
change in the rules, and also thought about their behavior in the new situation, while
subjects in the automatic removal treatment just continued doing what they had done
before, without even thinking of the change in the situation. The eﬀect we found could
then be explained as an eﬀect of habit formation (or use of a ”rule of thumb”) as opposed
to deliberate decision making
For real-life settings, we can learn from this firstly that it is possible to learn mutual
trust by starting out with an external punishment mechanism which is later removed.
Secondly, it is important that this punishment mechanism works eﬃciently, otherwise, no
trust is learned. Seemingly, it does not enhance cooperation after removal when parties
decide themselves that the punishment mechanism can disappear. In cases where the
police was ineﬃcient, this even reduces cooperation. If the mechanism disappears just
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automatically, people stick to the ”habits ” developed in subsequent rounds much longer,
than when they think of all the implications of removal of the police. Having thought
about it, only those who saw an eﬃcient police continued cooperating.
Future research should more systematically check for the eﬀects of failure in the rounds
with the police on later behavior, as this seems to play a larger role at least in the voting-
treatment, but could be analyzed here only based on a very small number of observations.
Furthermore, to rule out that the diﬀerences between the treatments are only due to
the fact that in the automatic removal situation people did not think at all about the
implications of the change, an experiment should be constructed where subjects also in
this condition are forced to think about the change. One could do this for example by
asking them to write down the implications of this change in the rules of the experiment.
This would allow to say whether the interpretation of the vote after no failure is seen
as a trust signal, while the vote after failure is seen as a signal of the contrary. A last
interesting topic for further research would be to use a continuous public good game, to
see whether a trust signal, i.e., voting for removal of the police after no failure, could
lead to even higher levels of cooperation than pure ”habit-formation” as observed with
automatic removal does.
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